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Hedge fund has been developed as a complex but, profitable investment area. Financial 
crisis of (2007-2009) had a negative impact on the overall hedge fund industry. ‘Hedge 
funds, as a group lost about 20 percent, which was double the loss of 1998, their prior 
worst year on record’ (Kaiser and  Haberfelner, 2011). Financial crisis of 2009, hit back 
many investors expectations as-well. Although, movement of money was slow, most of 
the hedge funds were steady in its return and growth. These aspects added numerous 
doubt and concerns regarding hedge fund return. Past researchers have already expressed 
concern regarding hedge fund return, which are affected by bias.
This research paper shall produce bias figures prevailing in the hedge fund industry. It 
shall  research  two  prime  bias:  survivorship  and  backfill  bias  and  calculate  them  to 
inspect, Is bias in hedge fund a crucial factor, while looking for real hedge fund growth? 
Barclay hedge fund database is used to conduct this research. Overall, 2411 hedge funds 
operating from (2009-2013) return figures are reviewed, individually.
Survivorship  and  backfill  bias  of  0.27  percentage  and  0.78  percentage  in  average 
annually,  are  reported  in  this  research  paper.  This  research  paper  conclusion  towards 
survivorship bias is in line with the conclusion drawn by Ackermann et al. (1991) and 
Brown et al. (2000) in their research paper of bias calculation. However, backfill bias in 
this paper is lower, compared with the past research done by several researchers on hedge 
fund bias analysis. Possible reasons can be, several funds who are performing well seeks 
anonymity  rather  than  publicity,  funds  operating  between  (2009-2013)  shows  some 
unique returns compared to past researchers research data on different time frame.
It shall also report on the alternative to hedge fund as fund of fund (FoF). This research 
shall  end with researcher  own comprehensive observation,  drawbacks in  the methods 
used to calculate bias and government efforts in the United States and European Union, in 
the form of new rules and regulation towards hedge fund. 
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1    INTRODUCTION
1.1   DEFINITION
‘Hedge  funds  are  lightly  regulated  active  investment  vehicles  with  great  trading 
flexibility.  Hedge  funds  are  believed  to  pursue  highly  sophisticated  investment 
strategies, and promise to deliver returns to their investors that are unaffected by the 
variety of financial markets’ (Ramadoria, Naik, Fung and Hsieh, 2008). Hedge funds are 
secretive, manages billions of dollars by investing on diversified projects with less or 
without any government supervision with sole motive to earn profit. The complexity in 
hedge fund and the strategies it uses are broad. ‘Hedge funds should not be considered 
to  behave  like  general  stock.  Empirically,  hedge  funds  do  not  have  their  worst 
performance when large shocks effect capital markets’ (Stulz, 2006). 
‘Hedge  funds  are  complicated  in  their  ways  of  operation  and  use  numerous 
controversial strategy to gain their objective. They are earning large sums whatever the 
economic climate is’ (Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz, 2006). ‘Empirically, hedge funds do 
not  have  their  worst  performance  when  large  shocks  affect  capital  markets’ (Stulz, 
2007).  These  scenarios  certainly  raises  questions  regarding  growth  of  hedge  fund 
industry.  Possible and widely accepted explanation can be,  hedge fund return is not 
actual. It is affected by its bias nature.
‘Bias in hedge fund that includes dead hedge fund performance being excluded and 
hedge funds that satisfy the inclusion criteria of a vendor and only those funds that have 
“good” performance and are looking to attract new investors want to be included in a 
database’ (Hsieh and Fung,  2004).  While  former creates  survivorship bias  and later 
creates backfill  bias.  ‘Survivorship bias results  from the fact that poorly performing 
funds disappear overtime: the calculation of funds returns based on surviving funds only 
can generate  an upward bias  in funds return’ (Liang,  2001).  Backfill  bias generates 
similar scenario as-well.
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Both major biases are ignored, while hedge fund overall return is calculated. In this 
regard, it is important that, return figure of hedge fund should be adjusted by including 
bias in it. 
1.2   GOALS
Several major financial institutions inject their savings in hedge fund. It is an obvious 
choice for several financial institutions. Hedge fund, in many cases returns on what it 
promised for. However, it is still a matter of discussion that, can their overall return 
figure be trusted? Although, few hedge fund vendors keep key information about their 
return, their database content and information differ. Hedge fund vendors have their 
own criterion to include certain hedge fund return in their database. Given criterion can 
be hedge fund turnover, currency it uses for reporting, growth rate along with others.
Hedge funds are not allowed to advertise their  return. Reporting its return figure to 
hedge fund vendor is an indirect way of marketing for hedge fund. Hedge fund prefers 
their return to be good, for the sake of its reporting as-well. Many hedge funds in this 
scenario, reports returns when they are earning good, else hedge funds shall not report. 
Reporting their return is not mandatory. This framework of not reporting return, unless 
better growth is not achieved, creates bias, which needed to be fixed. 
(Ackerman, 1999) research stated that, hedge funds report performance to commercial databases on a 
voluntary basis. Hence, they can decide when to begin or when to stop reporting. As a result, they and 
their  databases  are  prone  to  several  biases,  such  as  self-selection,  backfilling,  survivorship,  and  the 
liquidation  bias.  These  can  over-  or  understate  the  “true”  performance  of  the  market  (Kaiser  and  
Haberfelner, 2011).
This research paper shall focus on the calculation of two major bias by studying Barclay 
hedge fund database. Prime biases in hedge fund helps us to give bias free hedge fund 
return, to some extent. Mostly, bias in itself is hard to rectify. (Hsieh and Fung, 2004) 
convey that, ‘Hedge fund started reporting by 1990, but vendors started collecting data 
from 1993’. It is hard to get access to the universe of hedge fund since, every vendors 
criteria and method of information collection differs. Limitations are involved while 
calculating hedge fund. But, accurate level of hedge fund return helps investors to have 
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correct information, which can give investors with precise benchmarking against a stock 
market index.
Admittedly,  government  role  in  hedge  fund is  controversial.  Their  involvement,  by 
designing and implementing new regulations towards hedge fund is to lessen the risk of 
investors and the overall economy, by increasing information sharing among investors, 
regulators and hedge fund industry. However, regulations are keeping tight control on 
hedge fund. Hedge funds movement of money, strategy being used and its viability are 
constantly checked by respective government authority. It can be a wise step, but in the 
long term, hedge fund industry might have to lose many opportunities,  due to such 
rules.  Regulations  towards  hedge  fund  shall  be  discussed  along  with  the  possible 
alternative to hedge fund. Bias result from this research paper shall be reviewed with 
past researchers work.
1.3   Division
First part of this thesis shall look at the historic return of hedge funds. Historic return 
from hedge funds, level of bias in it and the conclusion derived by past researchers shall 
be discussed. Past research, on the methods for calculating survivorship and backfill 
bias and their drawbacks shall be covered. This research paper shall also highlight its 
own choice of method used for the calculating hedge fund bias and the reason behind it.
Second part of thesis shall present its bias result and comparison shall be made to past 
researchers bias figure. From (2009-2013), annual average growth of hedge fund shall 
be presented. This shall help to examine real performance of hedge fund. Hedge fund 
alternative as fund of fund shall be discussed as-well as fund of fund advantages over 
hedge fund. 
New regulations  towards hedge fund industry in  United States and European Union 
shall be examined. Higher secrecy in hedge fund industry have created confusion and a 
sense of insecurity towards investors. Public outcry towards hedge fund has increased, 
due  to  its  role  in  2009  financial  crisis  which  went  unchecked  by  government. 
Government rules and regulations are implemented to protect investors and the overall 
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economy from systematic risk. This debate shall be covered in the regulations part of 
this  research   paper.  Conclusion  of  this  research  shall  be  derived,  simultaneously. 
Researcher own observation towards overall research paper would be presented as-well.
1.4   RESEARCH QUESTION
     This research paper prime research questions are-
1. What is the main form of bias and how they occur?
2. What are the methods, available to calculate major bias in hedge fund?
3. What are the past research done on hedge fund bias, researchers conclusion and what 
is the bias figure during the period of (2009-2013)? 
4. Can bias in hedge fund be rectified, else what can be its alternative? 
5. What are the regulations in United States and European Union, towards hedge fund 
industry?
1.5   METHODOLOGY
In this research paper, Malkiel (1995) approach is used to calculate survivorship bias, 
instead of newer approach, due to its simple and accurate initiative towards calculating 
survivorship bias. Malkiel used this concept for calculating bias towards mutual fund. 
We shall apply this approach to hedge fund industry. 
The  standard  procedure  for  calculating  bias,  as  in  Malkiel  (1995)  is  to  obtain  the 
population of all mutual funds, (In our case, hedge fund) that operated during a given 
period. The average return of all hedge funds (live and dead) are compared with that of 
the surviving hedge funds at the end of period. Return difference is survivorship bias. 
Malkiel estimated survivorship bias of 0.5 percentage points (pps) a year return.
In  this  research  paper,  researcher  calculated  survivorship  bias  following  above 
mentioned  approach.  2213  live  and  198  dead  funds  annual  returns  are  studied 
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respectively. Both funds, (live and dead) funds five years mean return from (2009-2013) 
were  calculated  and  above  mentioned  method  for  calculating  survivorship  bias  is 
implemented, accordingly.
Final result of survivorship bias in this research paper is consistent with Ackermann 
(1999) and Liang (2000) calculations on hedge fund bias analysis.
On the other  hand, backfill  bias  calculation methods appear to  be in the process of 
development towards more scientific approach. Yet, researcher have used (Hsieh and 
Fung, 2000) method of calculating backfill bias.
To estimate the magnitude of instant history bias/backfill bias, Fung and Hsieh (2000), 
‘studied the hedge fund in the TASS database, which reports the inception date of each 
fund as-well as the date the fund entered the database’. (Fung and Hsieh) ‘Measured the 
bias as the average difference between two portfolio. First, it was observable portfolio, 
but after dropping the first 12 monthly return of every fund’ (Fung and Hsieh, 2002). 
(Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu, 2010) stated that, ‘(Hsieh and Fung, 2002) found medium lag 
of 343 days and delete the first 12 months of all funds’ reported returns, finding an 
instant history bias of 1.4% per year’. While few researchers dropped 24 months return 
and followed the same approach stated by (Hsieh and Fung, 2002), but this process is 
not scientific and exclude large number of data.
In this research paper, two portfolios are established. First portfolio is, five years overall 
mean value of funds return, operating from (2009-2013). Second portfolio is, overall 
mean return of the fund value for four years, after dropping the first 12 monthly return 
of  every  fund  from  the  time  period  of  (2009-2013).  Both  portfolio  difference 
respectively give us overall backfill bias prevailing in hedge fund industry for five years 
between (2009-2013).
1.6   REFERENCES USED 
Sheer bias analysis for hedge funds are available, but few in number. Malkiel(1995), 
Ramadorai(2007),  Fung  and  Hsieh(2007),  Liang(2000)  are  some  of  the  researchers, 
10
whose past  research  papers  are  reviewed  as  a  reference.  Other  key  references,  like 
newspapers, magazines including The Economist, Hedge Fund Co., Wall Street Journal, 
The Financial Times, The New York times are examined as-well.
Kaiser  and  Haberfelner(2010),  Liang(2001)  and  Hsieh  and  Fung(2009)  works  are 
reviewed. They were important to get final conclusion in this research paper.
      2   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Hedge fund got controversial  with fraud cases and Ponzi schemes.  Past researchers, 
including Malkiel were interested in the reality behind mutual fund return, which was 
also facing similar criticism. However,  it  became increasingly clear that hedge fund 
also,  does  not  represent  real  growth  in  its  growth  figure.  (Hsieh  and  Fung,  2000) 
approach  towards  hedge  fund bias  calculation  answer  several  key  questions  in  this 
research paper. Their observation that, hedge fund may not be removed completely and 
past researchers conclusion drawn from their research were vital, to find reality behind 
hedge fund bias. Although, prime biases were calculated by various researchers in the 
past, but adding prime bias in the given hedge fund return may not represent real hedge 
fund return. Several minor biases are excluded in this process. In addition, different 
database  and  their  own  criteria  of  keeping  record  of  hedge  fund  return  makes 
researchers research limited to one specific database.
Governments  are  involved  in  hedge  fund  industry  to  make  it  more  transparent. 
Regulations, which seek hedge fund to open up itself towards its investors can help to 
reduce bias in hedge fund industry. But, they are not enough. Governments are facing 
increasing  public  pressure,  to  limit  hedge  fund  activities  including  several  other 
financial  institutions.  Hedge fund risk,  in case of failure has increased significantly, 
since it would have impact to the overall economy. Regulations might help to bring 
transparency, but it lacks to support hedge fund positive aspect of creating liquidity in 
the economy. Free movement of money by hedge fund has resulted in higher liquidity in 
the  economy.  It  further  increases  economic  activity.  Now,  with  new regulations  in 
European Union and United States, it might have negative impact on overall economy. 
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2.1   HEDGE FUND BIAS
Hedge fund bias prevails since hedge fund was created, due to its free nature. It does not 
need to report it's earning to anyone. Many hedge fund reports its return, when it is 
finally doing fine.  Several hedge funds does not  report  its  return on the year of its 
establishment.  New hedge funds rarely makes  impressive return.  Subsequently,  they 
might wait for impressive return, to report. On the other hand, hedge fund still may not 
report its return since; it does not want any more publicity of its earning. They do not 
want new investors in their company. This process creates backfill bias. 
It is hard to conclude which hedge fund is new, who are gone out of business and who 
are staying in the business, who are staying in the business but they not reporting to the 
vendor.  Investors may not  be sure with the information they have from hedge fund 
industry. This might leads to wrong decisions. Investors has right to know, influence of 
bias in hedge fund. Investors need to have bias figure. It helps investors to compare bias 
figure with given hedge fund return for better and informed decision. Bias pull or push 
hedge fund return. Therefore, real hedge fund return need to include bias figure in it.
Bias in hedge funds are divided mainly in two parts due to its  ramifications and occurrence.  We can 
further divide biases that are consequences of sampling from an unobservable universe of hedge funds, 
that  we  call  “natural  biases,”  and  those  that  arise  from  the  way  data  vendors  collect  hedge  fund 
information, that we call “spurious biases (Hsieh and Fung, 2002). 
1) Survivorship Bias and 2) Backfill Bias. Other biases are A) Defunct Bias B) Selection 
Bias C) Instant History Bias. This research paper shall focus on two major bias with 
their level of influence on hedge fund return.
2.2   PAST TREND
‘Empirically, hedge funds do not have their worst performance when large shocks effect 
capital  markets’  (Boyson,  Stahel,  and  Stulz,  2006).  Hedge  fund  earns,  even  when 
economy goes to slump. This is one of the unique characteristic of hedge fund. 
‘Hedge  fund  mangers  are  paid  highly  for  the  returns  they  earn.  However,  there  is 
increasing evidence that the behaviour of hedge fund indices can largely be replicated 
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by machines’ (Kat and Palaro, 2006). Investors, who want to achieve certain hedge fund 
benchmark can have a cheaper alternative to high-cost hedge fund managers. There are 
alternatives to hedge fund managers. However, Ponzi schemes that lured large banks 
saving from all over the world made many interested on why such a blind faith to hedge 
fund company? Do hedge fund delivers what they say? Are their return figure real?
Strategies used by hedge fund managers, whatever the situation can be, are identical but 
returns  of  hedge  fund  differs  widely  among  different  hedge  fund  companies.  This 
feature raises several questions on hedge fund return figure. Key hedge fund strategies 
can be:
1. Global Macro: This strategy makes investments, that are big in nature, at international 
level. It includes, investments on the future of currency trading, government issued T-
Bills,  stocks  and  the  like.  Extensive  knowledge  is  required  on  nations  economy, 
government current and future policy, economic indicators for these types of investment 
to be successful. These investments, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) are often welcomed by foreign nation as it helps to 
increase nations current account. 
2. Long/Short: Strategy, mostly used by hedge fund industry where, company buy back 
equities whose value are expected to raise in near future and sell off equities whose 
value is expected to decrease in future. This strategy can be beneficial when long term 
position pay off more, compared to short term position. Else, hedge fund net return by 
this strategy can be low or might face loss as-well.
3. Distressed: Hedge fund Industry might invest in companies, which are going through 
economic hardship or moving out of it. They might involve in covering loans/debt held 
by banks, private personnel which gives them certain percentage of company ownership 
in the form of shares, bonds and the like. Hedge fund company have their own future 
plan,  for the company of their  investment.  In this  scenario,  most of the hedge fund 
company seeks to sell off its ownership of a company, when it is finally doing good. 
This is short term position. In the long term, hedge fund might get involved in day to 
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day  decision  making  to  see  company  grow.  This  position  is  risky  but  on  positive 
circumstances, it bears profit regularly.
4. Market Neutral: Strategy used by hedge fund company in which it stays neutral to the 
movement of market and do nothing for a time being. It tries to save its investment from 
the  exposure  to  the  market  risk,  entirely.  Barclay  hedge  fund  database  describes  it 
further as, ‘At the core, market-neutral strategies focus on making concentrated bets, 
usually based on a perceived pricing asymmetry, while limiting general market exposure 
through a combination of long and short positions. The ultimate goal is to achieve a beta 
as close to zero as possible to protect against systematic risk’.
Researchers over a decade has identified many replication strategies capable of capturing between 40% to 
80% of the average return of many popular hedge fund strategies. Investors are beginning to take notice of 
these replication strategies, especially because of their rule based, transparent features and the fact that 
they can be executed at low cost (Fung and Hsieh, 2007). 
Investors ignored this particular background. They still rely on the expertise of hedge 
fund managers. Investors, many of them are not fully aware of what is going on with 
hedge fund and its return. Growth figures are accepted by investors, unquestionably. 
This should not be the case. With such a limited strategy in hand, it is insecure to accept 
growth figure of hedge fund, especially after 2009 financial crisis. Investors, many of 
them are not be aware of bias in hedge fund, which plays principle role in determining 
growth figures of hedge fund, on which investors decisions are based.
‘Many hedge funds today have no true hedge at all, rather they increase risk through 
leverage,  concentration,  and by trading in  illiquid assets’ (Longo, 2009).  During the 
period of economic slump, hedge fund took higher risk for better return. Specific details 
regarding  risky  approach  by  hedge  fund  company  are  unknown to  many  investors. 
Hedge fund might  never  disclose it.  Hedge fund adopting risky approach can rouse 
further bias in hedge fund. Lacks of proper regulations have made bias key aspects in 
discovering real growth in hedge fund.
Few researchers found opposite return in hedge fund, then what was declared. Using the 
Lipper  TASS  dataset,  (Malkiel  and  Saha)  found  that,  ‘Hedge  fund  returns  are 
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significantly worse at the end of their reporting live. Researchers have argued that funds 
stop reporting when they perform poorly relative to other funds’ (Malkiel and Saha, 
2006).  Except survivorship bias, backfill  bias was also widely reported.  Researchers 
also suggested that, hedge fund managers report or start to report only from a period 
when performance is good. It indicate, bias in hedge fund is a major topic.
Bias not only inflate  hedge fund return,  but  it  has  long term significance on hedge fund true value. 
Adjusting bias brings the net return from 14.88% to 7.70% for the equally weighted  sample. Over the 
entire period, this return is slightly lower than the S&P 500 return of 8.04%, but includes a statistically 
significant positive alpha (Ibbotson, Chen, Zhu and Hom, 2010).     
Authors 
Name
Database Number  of 
Funds
Time Period Survivorship Bias
Ackerman 
al. (1999 
MAR/HFR 547 1988-1995 0,16
Ammann  and 
Moerth 
(2005) 
TASS 4014 1994-2005 3,54
Amin  and 
Kat (2003) 
TASS 1,721 1994-2001 1,89
Anjilvel et 
al. (2000) 
FRAM 1,130 1990-2000 2.20 
Baquero  et 
al. (2004) 
TASS 1,797 1994-2000 2,10
Bares  et 
al. (2002) 
FRAM 2,308 1996-1999 1,30
Bianchi and 
Drew (2006) 
TASS 3,012 1994-2001 3,01
Brown  et 
al. (1999) 
OFFSHORE 
DIRECTORY
395 1989-1995 0,75
Capocci  et 
al. (2005) 
MAR 2,796 1994-2002 1,51
Darst 
(2000) 
MAR 2,202 1995-2000 1,15
     Table 1: Survivorship bias reported by researchers.
(Fung and Hsieh, 2000) report, ‘survivorship bias of 1.4 percentage per year for funds of 
hedge funds versus 3 percentage per year for hedge funds’ , and (Liang, 2003) reports, 
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‘survivorship bias of 1.18 percentage per year for funds of hedge funds versus 2.32 
percentage per year for hedge funds’ (Ammann and Moerth, 2005). 
Using  annual  data  from  The  US  offshore  Funds  Directory,  Brown,  Goetzman  and  Ibbotson  (1999) 
investigate the performance and survival of offshore hedge fund. Researchers found that, these hedge fund 
display positive systematic risk adjustment returns. The superior performance does not appear to steam 
from the managerial skills, for they find no evidence of performance persistent. However, some of the 
positive hedge fund return from survival related conditioning biases. Several practitioners using a large 
sample of hedge funds also find the evidence of superior hedge fund performance (Ackerman, MacEnally 
and Ravenscraft, 1999).
Authors 
Name
Database Number of 
Funds
Time Period Deleted 
Months
Backfill 
Bias
Edwards and 
Caglayan 
(2001 
MAR 1,665 1990-1998 12 1,17
Fung and 
Hsieh 
(2000) 
TASS 1,742 1994-1998 12 1,40
Ibbotson et 
al. (2010) 
TASS 1995-2010 1995-2010 INDIVIDUAL 4,02
Malkiel and 
Saha (2005) 
TASS 2,065 1994-2003 12 5,74
     Table 2. Backfill bias reported by researchers.
Note: Table 1 and 2 derived from (Kaiser and Haberfelner, 2011).
(Posthuma and Sluis), in their research paper used TASS hedge fund database, to determine backfill bias. 
Central area in their research was, to calculate backfill bias through the use of, exact date the fund decides  
to report its return in TASS database. With this information, researchers were able to determine for each 
fund the time period that was backfilled. Subsequently, they were able to remove the backfilled returns  
from the data set to obtain data set that is free of backfill bias (Posthuma and Sluis, 2003). 
They got annual 4 percentage of backfill bias, which is similar to the return of Ibbotson 
research. 
(Fung and Hsieh, 2009), found that, ‘40 percent of the 100 biggest hedge funds do not 
report performance to databases. They argued that, these firms have reached their high 
levels of assets under management because of good performance’. For example, Asness 
et al. (2001), ‘consider the impact of the self-selection bias to be minimal’. Ackermann 
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et  al.  (1999),  believe that,  ‘the  overall  effects  of  the survivorship bias  and the self-
selection bias will cancels one another out’.
Aiken et al. (2010), constructed a dataset of 1,193 hedge funds that have never reported to a database and 
compare it to hedge funds that have reported performance. They conclude that, between 2004 and 2008, 
the self-selection bias resulted in an approximately 2 percent per annum overestimate of average hedge 
fund performance (Kaiser and Haberfelner, 2011).
2.2.1   Essence of Hedge fund Bias
Major bias, that prevails in hedge fund also exist on the same manner in other funds, 
including mutual fund. But, compared to hedge fund, other funds are less error prone to 
the major bias, which is of significance in hedge fund. Frequency of bias occurrence in 
other funds are less, compared to hedge fund. Lack of transparency in hedge fund makes 
their return figure more questionable.
Hedge fund uses various diversified strategies to gain profit. Some of the strategies as 
discussed before in this  paper are highly controversial  including Long/Short,  Global 
macro to name some of them. During 1997 Asian financial crisis, which caused nations 
with strong economy, often referred as Tiger economies including Thailand, Malaysia to 
move towards economic slump, Malaysian Prime Minister referred to Geroge Soros, 
financier  as-well  as  hedge  fund  manager,  for  causing  the  crisis.  Economic  factors, 
including pegged currency of tiger economies with dollar, which caused the crisis, that 
was further triggered by raising inflation in these tiger economy. However, pointing out 
to the Malaysian Prime Minister above mentioned view, it might be the case that, hedge 
fund might not have caused the crisis, but they were involved with these economies, 
speculating  on  their  currency  future.  It  shows  that,  hedge  fund  significance  has 
increased further, in todays globalised world.
Nowadays, investments are increasing in hedge fund industry. Investors however, pay 
large sum to hedge fund company, not only for their investment but, certain percentage 
of its profit to hedge fund managers skills as-well. Bias prevailing in hedge fund makes 
it troublesome to inspect, Are there any manager skills involved in hedge fund better 
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operation  or  given  profit  from  certain  investment  is  only  due  to  positive  market 
movement? In such situation, when investors are not aware of this fact, they are paying 
huge amount without considering these facts. These are important features, which are 
needed to be disclosed. It can happen when real growth of hedge fund is presented, by 
avoiding bias in it. This makes bias, as a topic in hedge fund more worthwhile.
2.2.2   Survivorship Bias
Most of the researchers suggested, survivorship bias push up the overall performance of 
hedge fund the most.  Survivorship  bias  is  calculated  differently  by various  authors, 
since they are defined differently as-well. 
For example: (i) survivorship bias is about comparison with a sample containing defunct funds with a 
sample that  does not contain defunct funds.  (ii)  survivorship bias is about comparison with a sample 
containing all funds with a sample that does not contain defunct funds. (iii) survivorship bias originates 
from defunct funds, failing to report their last returns. This bias is referred as liquidation bias (Posthumay 
and Sluiz, 2003). 
Survivorship bias is created as a function of manager self-reporting, whereby a constituent index manager 
has the ability to discontinue reporting performance of their fund as a result of poor performance of which 
he may not want investors to be aware, implicitly biasing upward the index result because it includes only  
the subset of funds which continue to report (or excludes those which discontinue to report). While it is 
possible for self-reporting (or non-reporting) to create a bias, several clarifications are important  with 
regard to this (Hedge Fund Research Inc. presentation to U.S Lab-our Dept, 2011). 
Debate is ongoing, regarding the term, dead fund. Some funds, stop reporting and are 
dead, but they are not liquidated completely. This makes it a wrong judgement to call 
them dead.  These  aspects  are  ignored  in  most  of  the  survivorship  bias  calculation. 
However, it is also hard to get hold of these specified data and the status of hedge funds,  
which are not reporting.
2.2.3   Past Research
Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), inspected survivorship bias on returns using off-shore hedge 
funds. They reported an attrition rate of about 14 percentage per year over 1989–1995. Their estimate of  
the survivorship bias was around a 3 percentage unrealisable return per year. This result is consistent with 
the 3 percentage estimate provided by Fung and Hsieh (2000) on the TASS database from 1994–1998 
(Ibbotson,  Chen  and  Zhu,  2010).  Grinblatt  & Titman  (1989),  Brown,  Goetzmann,  Ibbotson  & Ross 
(1992),  and  Malkiel  (1995)  estimated yearly  survivorship bias  to  the  range of  0.5 percentage to  1.4  
percentage (Bianchi and Drew, 2006). 
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‘During and after the financial crisis, liquidation of hedge fund increased rapidly. In an 
environment  in  which  stocks  and  commodities  lost  between  35  and  40  percent  on 
average,  many  hedge  funds  failed  to  generate  their  promised  absolute  returns’ 
(Haberfelner, Florian and Kaiser, Dieter, 2011). 
2.2.4   Methods of Calculation (Survivorship Bias)
The standard procedure,  stated by Malkiel  (1995),  is  used in this  research paper,  as 
described before in this research paper. (Liang, 2002), uses a similar method, whereby 
sum of (Dead and Live) funds were subtracted from live fund, to calculate survivorship 
bias.
2.2.5   Contradictions
(Hsieh and Fung), were dismissive about the ways survivorship bias can be remedied. 
Although, both researchers draw great deal of conclusions on the rate of survivorship 
bias by implementing Malkiel(1995) method. However, researchers does not find those 
results accurate. They point out different methods being used to collect data and finalise 
the result. ‘Differences in data collection methodologies could result in different degrees 
of relation bias and instant history bias. That is, “missing funds” could be a consequence 
of data collection methodologies’ (Hsieh and Fung, 2002). 
Currently, observable hedge funds in databases do not fully reflect the universe of all hedge funds. In 
time, observable funds may converge to the universe of all hedge funds, and from that point forward,  
analysts  can  remedy  survivorship  bias  by  analytical  methods.  Until  convergence  occurs,  however,  
performance statistics  derived  from the  observable  funds  remain  biased  estimators  of  the  population 
statistics.  And  time  series  of  returns  prior  to  the  “point  of  convergence”  will  remain  vulnerable  to 
survivorship bias. It was also concluded that, natural bias such as survivorship bias can not be rectified  
(Hsieh and Fung, 2002). 
Survivorship  bias  and  its  method  of  calculation  differs  among  researchers.  Several 
researchers define survivorship bias as, originating from defunct funds, failing to report 
their last returns. This bias is also called liquidation bias. The trouble with this approach 
is that, it does not take into account those funds which are dead but has not liquidated 
completely. In-addition, some funds do not want to report its return because they do not 
want new investors in their company. Overall, various ways of calculating survivorship 
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bias including Malkiel (1995) approach, may not take into account these scenarios of 
hedge funds.
2.3   Backfill Bias
Hedge funds are not allowed to advertise. Most of them start to report when they start to 
get better performance. This result in the inception date differing from the reporting date 
of hedge fund performance. This process makes overall hedge fund return calculation 
unreliable due to few hedge funds, which never mention their real initial return. This 
creates backfill bias. 
2.3.1   Past Research
Fung and Hsieh (2000), studied the ‘distribution across funds of the lag between each 
hedge fund’s inception date and the date at which it enters the database. They find a 
median lag of 343 days and delete the first 12 months of all funds reported returns, 
finding an instant history bias of 1.4 percentage per year’. Malkiel and Saha (2005), 
also  studied  the  impacts  of  various  reporting  biases  in  the  hedge  fund  data.  They 
estimated that, backfill bias is over 500 basis points higher than the contemporaneously 
reported returns from 1994 to 2003. 
2.3.2   Methods of Calculation (Backfill Bias)
(Fung and Hsieh,  2000) found that,  in general,  ‘Backfilled data  can be rectified by 
dropping first 12 months period’. Some researchers dropped 24 months, calming this 
can further rectify backfill bias. 
(Ammann, Huber and Schmidt, 2009), removed backfilling bias (or instant history bias) by deleting all 
backfilled entries which were added to the database before a fund started reporting to the database. This 
date is known for roughly 95 percentage of all funds in their sample. For the remaining 5 percentage ,  
researchers followed common practice and delete the first 12 return observations (e.g., Fung and Hsieh,  
2000; Edwards and Caglayan, 2001).
 2.3.3   Contradictions
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It is difficult to know when exactly was the hedge fund established. Some hedge fund 
started reporting  or  they were motivated to  report  when they were gaining  positive 
return. 
(Hsieh and Fung, 2002) mentioned that, hedge funds that satisfy the inclusion criteria of a vendor and 
only those  funds that  have  “good” performance and are looking to  attract  new investors  want  to  be 
included in a database  of the three major hedge fund database vendors, one (HFR) excludes managed 
futures programs, but two (TASS and Managed Account Research, MAR) include them. Funds enter a 
database with, in the words of Park (1995), instant history. Fung and Hsieh (2009), find that 40 percent of  
the 100 biggest hedge funds do not report performance to databases. 
3    RESEARCH DATA
All-together, 2411 hedge funds were individually researched. Researcher set up criteria 
for the funds to be included in the research paper, which are:
1.  Hedge  fund  trading  on  three  currencies:  US  dollar,  EUR  and  Pound  are  only 
considered.
2. Research is done with funds that registered continuous annual return. 
In this research paper, funds that report continuous annual return, from (2009-2013) and 
all those who meet all the above mentioned criterion are only considered. Hedge funds, 
which are established after 2009 or on 2013 are not included in this research. Minimum 
criteria are limited so that, higher numbers of funds are included in this research.
3.1   Final Result
2213 live hedge funds return and 198 dead funds return for five years, from time period 
(2009-2013) were calculated.  Live hedge fund return from (2009-2013),  all-together 
averaged 13.34 percentage.
Most of the hedge funds within Barclay database were revealing pattern of exceptional 
return per annum. There were few hedge funds with return of over 100 percentage on 
2009 but, end with below 1-3 percentage return rate in 2013. This was notable pattern. 
Some funds have started to report by 2009 but, with a return of 0 percentage for whole 
21
year of 2009. Although these patterns are suspicious but, those funds were included as-
well in the research.
Figure of survivorship bias is low, with average 0.27 percentage per annum. This result 
is similar to (Liang, 2000), which showed 0.60 percentage of annual survivorship bias 
from (1990-1999).  Liang  expressed  that,  ‘positive  survivorship  bias  in  his  findings 
confirm main reason for a funds disappearance is, poor performance’.
From (2010-2013), each hedge fund average growth were calculated, as shown in the 
figure below, to get backfill bias figure. Average growth for 4 years (2010-2013), is 9.43 
percentage. Average figures were calculated, with up to date data available. Estimating 
overall figure from our analysis, backfill bias stands at an average 0.78 percentage per 
annum. 
Table 3-5 below shows overall summary of the hedge fund bias calculations from the 
time period, (2009-2013).
Live  Funds  (2009-
2013)
Dead Funds (2009-2013)
Number of Funds 2213 198
Average return rate (2009-2013) 13.34% 10.57%
    Table 3. Live and Dead hedge fund (2009-2013) return.
Average  of{Live  +  Dead 
Fund (2009-2013)}=A
Live  Fund= 
(B)
B-A:  Survivorship  Bias 
(2009-2013)
Average  growth  rate 
(2009-2013)
11.95% 13.34% 0.27% per annum
Table 4. Survivorship bias calculation.
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{Live Funds (2009-
2013)}= C
{Funds  growth  after 
dropping  the  (first  12 
monthly return)}= D
(C-D): Backfill bias
Average  growth 
rate
13.34% 9.43% 0.78% per annum
Table 5. Backfill bias calculation.
Although, there is not any specific measure of benchmarking for hedge fund industry, 
but we shall use S and P 500 to compare hedge fund return before including bias. It will 
helps us to see how well hedge funds are performing. 
Financial crisis of 2009 created economic downturn in several economies. Hedge fund 
industry average five years mean return stands at 13.34 percentage in this research from 
(2009-2013). Benchmarking hedge fund return figures of five years with S and P 500, 
later outbids hedge fund industry by greater margin. 
Most of the hedge funds reported annual return to Barclay hedge fund database from 
(2009-2013)  with  consistency.  However,  some  funds  with  annual  growth  of  2-3 
percentage  had  over  100-300  percentage  growth  in  the  middle  of  2010-2011  when 
economy were going through financial crisis. These figures were included as-well, in 
this research paper but, these figures made significant positive impact on the hedge fund 
overall return figure.
3.2   Limitation of Research
This research is based on the reporting of hedge funds which are registered in Barclay 
hedge fund. Barclay hedge fund maintained well and up-to date list of hedge funds, but 
it does not have the universe of whole hedge funds. Moreover, it does not accept some 
hedge fund reporting, due to its own criteria of including hedge fund performance in it.
(Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999), stated that, excluding disappearing funds has virtually no 
impact on our assessment on overall performance. Self-selection bias has the two implications for hedge 
funds  research.  First,  some  hedge  funds  may  not  actively  seek  new  money,  because  there  may  be 
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diminishing returns to their arbitrage strategies. Second, some of the best hedge fund managers may be 
opting out of the databases (Saha, Malkiel and Grecu, 2006). 
Result might be, both bias have no impact on the hedge fund return. However, in this 
research, this is not the case. There are still, limited impact.
(Hsieh and Fung, 2002), supports the idea that instead of looking for hedge fund performance, fund of 
fund or investors experience can be reviewed for better investment decision. They point out to the fact,  
that hedge fund cannot be remedied. First, no realistic way exists of verifying that complete records of 
defunct funds were used to adjust the index returns for survivorship bias, especially prior to the mid  
1990s. Second, differences in data collection methodologies could result in different degrees of relation 
bias  and  instant  history  bias.  That  is,  “missing  funds”  could  be  a  consequence  of  data  collection 
methodologies (Hsieh and Fung, 2002). 
4   Fund of Fund (FoFs)
Barclay  hedge fund reported  that,  ‘A fund of  hedge fund is  an  investment  vehicle, 
whose portfolio consists of shares in several hedge funds. The fund of funds strategy 
can be applied to any type of investment fund, from a mutual fund to a private equity 
fund’. It allows investors with broad diversification. Unlike hedge fund, investors can 
invest to fund which have numerous diversification in one fund. 
    4.1   Fund of Fund and Bias
(Hsieh  and  Fung,  2004),  expressed  that,  most  direct  way  to  measure  hedge  fund 
performance  is  to   observe  the  investment  experience  of  hedge  fund  investors 
themselves the funds of hedge funds. Researchers claimed, about risk characteristics, 
indexes of fund of fund is more indicative of the demand side dynamics driven by hedge 
fund investors preferences than are broad- based indexes. They pointed out that fund of 
fund characteristic in their performance is driven not only by Global scenario, but also 
by the investors performance. 
(Hsieh and Fung, 2004), indicated that, fund of fund do not suffer from survivorship bias 
due to their reporting style. According to them, most of the fund of fund make audited 
performance reports to their investors that include investments in successful funds as 
well as “mistakes,” so a successful investment in a hedge fund that reached capacity 
constraint and stopped reporting to database vendors will remain in the history.
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Fung  and  Hsieh  (2000),  revealed  survivorship  bias  in  fund  of  fund  returns  are  less  severe  than  in 
individual the hedge funds. The reason is that fund of fund, through the natural process of diversification, 
inadvertently minimise the measurement errors that may arise(Fung and Hsieh, 2004). Researchers also 
conveyed that selection bias is also not relevant in fund of fund. An individual hedge fund may choose not 
to participate in a database, but its return is fully embedded in the performance of any fund of fund that 
invests in it. When a fund of fund adds a hedge fund to its portfolio, the portfolio’s history is not affected, 
so the issue of instant history bias does not arise (Fung and Hsieh, 2004).
4.2   Past Research and Trend
Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2007), investigate the performance of funds-of-funds. Authors argued 
that, the data are much better for funds-of-funds than it is for individual hedge funds and does not suffer  
seriously from the problems discussed earlier.  Researchers  considered three separate periods:  January 
1995 to September 1998; October 1998 to March 2000; and April 2000 to December 2004. They found 
that average fund-of-funds has a significant positive alpha (Excess return gained by superior manager  
skills) during the second period they consider, but the alpha is insignificant in the other two periods. The 
study also distinguishes between two different groups of funds-of-funds. 
‘Investors are attracted to fund of fund, but comparing the returns, fund of fund falls 
short according to one of the report from’ (Bernstein Wealth Management, 2006). There 
are alternatives to hedge fund, but they lack similar kind of return than,  hedge fund 
provides.
5.0  HEDGE FUND REGULATIONS
 Ethical aspects of hedge funds are denounced by critics of hedge fund. ‘Regulators are 
concerned about the risks of hedge funds for at least four reasons: investor protection, 
risks to financial institutions, liquidity risks, and excess volatility risks’ (Stulz, 2007). 
Academia pointed out hedge fund negative role, towards recent Greek economic crisis. 
Hedge fund pull out most of their money being invested in Greece during its turbulent 
time, that also had some part to play in Greek economic crisis, to get worse. 
Yet,  hedge  funds  often  profit  by  providing  liquidity  to  the  markets  by  buying  securities  that  are 
temporarily depressed because of market disruptions. The role of hedge funds in making markets more 
liquid and  in  reducing  market  inefficiencies  makes  it  necessary  for  those  who want  to  restrict  their 
activities to have a compelling case that their possible adverse impact on market volatility outweighs their  
positive effects (Stulz, 2007). 
Keeping this fact in mind, government role with new rules need to focus more on the 
aspects of transparency in hedge fund rather than restricting its movement. 
In the fall of 1999, two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund 
disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But, 
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when the legislative firestorm sparked by the Long term capital Management (LTCM) episode finally 
quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds (Edwards, 2003). 
Now, situation has changed.  Governments needed to make bold decisions.  Financial 
crisis of 2009 forced regulators to make bold move towards hedge fund industry.
5.1   European Union Hedge Fund Regulation
Alternative Investment Fund Managers directives (AIFMD), is one of the crucial policy 
towards regulating hedge fund and private equity inside European Union (EU). Memo 
published by EU on Nov.,  2010 states that,  (AIFMD) would be applied by member 
states into national law by 2013. 
European  Commission  published  document,  related  to  (AIFDM).  On  its  Executive 
summary of impact  assessment on Dec.,  2012, it  pointed out  four key problems on 
Alternative  Investment  Fund  (AIF),  which  includes  hedge  fund  as-well.  It  states, 
‘Alternative  Investment  fund  Manager  (AIFM)  activity  to  have  impact  on  overall 
financial stability, investors protection, Micro and Macro prudential risks’. 
Several  key  measures  were  indicated  on  the  European  Commission  (EC)  executive 
summary  of  April,  2009  regarding  (AIF).  It  includes,  ‘objective  to  develop  single 
market for (AIF), ensure that all (AIFM) are subject to appropriate authorisation and 
registration requirements, enhance public accountability of (AIFM) holding controlling 
stakes in companies, to name few of them’. 
Measures  like,  common  approach  towards  asset  under  management,  calculation  of 
leverage  to  determine  level  of  risk  being  involved,  additional  own  fund  to  cover 
professional liability risk, scope of cash monitoring, reporting to competent authority 
were implemented as described in Executive summary of impact assessment on Dec., 
2012. European Union president Barroso stated, in a European Commission statement 
at  the occasion of  European Commission  vote on the  directives  of  hedge fund and 
private equity, ‘The adoption of the directive means that hedge funds and private equity 
will no longer operate in a regulatory void outside the scope of supervisors. The new 
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regime  brings  transparency  and  security  to  the  way  these  funds  are  managed  and 
operate, which adds to the overall stability of our financial system’. 
European Market Infrastructure Regulations (EMIR), is regulations towards hedge fund 
industry. It further refines rules towards over-the-counter derivatives, central counter-
parties and trade repositories. Derivatives refers to any financial contract whose values 
are derived from other major entities like Interest. Over-the-counter derivatives refers to, 
financial dealings held between two parties without any involvement of security and 
exchange. Trade repositories are central institution that collects information of over-the-
counter derivatives. While central counter-parties (CCP) refers to, the middle man who 
guarantees two parties  doing trade that,  if  one party defaults,  central  counter-parties 
would fulfill defaulted party obligations to the other remaining parties. These standards 
are already implemented by March, 2013.
Market abuse directives (MAD), objective is to protect investors from insider dealings, 
misleading information and maintain the integrity of the European Financial institution 
and keep the investors confidence. Severe sanctions and effective investigations are in 
place, to maintain the objective.
5.2   United States Hedge Fund Regulations
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), is formed to stop US citizens to avoid 
tax on their income by investing in offshore funds. Financial institutions including hedge 
fund,  mutual  fund  need  to  disclose  information  to  respective  authority  about  their 
investors. Failing to do so results in heavy fines and other legal proceedings. Investors, 
who prefers  secrecy  while  investing  in  offshore  hedge  fund may not  perform same 
anonymity, like before. It might discourage them to invest. This regulation became law 
by March, 2010. 
Most hedge funds are not required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under  
the Investment Company Act of 1940 or the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In 2004, the Security and 
Exchange Commission implemented a rule that would have required all hedge fund advisers to register 
with the Securities and  Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act. In the wake of the 
financial  crisis,  Congress  and  President  Obama’s  Administration  debated  proposals  for  financial 
regulatory reform (Ruane and Seitzinger, 2010). 
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This debate started a series of reform, targeted towards hedge fund.
In the court case, Goldstein v. SEC where, Securities and Exchange Commission request 
towards hedge fund disclosure was scrapped by District of Columbia court in June 2006. 
Hedge funds were allowed to practice anonymity just like before.  Financial crisis of 
2009 changed it all.
Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac failure, which also helped to spread financial crisis in 
major banking system, forced government to act. There was possibility of systematic 
risk.  It  refers  to  the event,  when collapse one entity  to have broader  impact  on the 
overall financial system, rather than the impact limited to only one entity. Instead of 
waiting  for  big credit  bubble  to  burst,  which might  have  negative impact  on whole 
financial institution, American government rescued these troubled institution with tax 
payers money. Pile of toxic assets were government problem now. These assets were 
covered by tax payers money. Several voices were raised against the use of tax payers 
money in these ways. In these situation, government came up with regulations for the 
security of overall financial institutions. Most importantly, government had to act so that 
above mentioned scenarios does not occur, again.
Dodd-Frank act: Title IV is specially targeted to fund-managers including hedge funds, 
which manage huge assets and are prone to such systematic risk. These advisors need to 
register  with  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  and  Federal  deposit  Insurance 
cooperation (FDIC). Fund managers need to disclose informations. This disclosure of 
information  which  also  includes  asset  under  management,  leverage  used,  trading 
practices  to  name  few  of  them.  These  disclosures  helps  government  designated 
organization to study particularly, risk involved in certain strategy of these funds, which 
might  have  impact  on  investors  investment,  towards  other  financial  institutions  and 
might be towards overall economy.
The Dodd Frank Act requires the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the‐  
appropriate  criteria  for  determining  the  financial  thresholds  or  other  criteria  needed  to  qualify  for 
accredited investor status and eligibility to invest in private funds. Moreover, The Dodd Frank Act directs‐  
the SEC's Division of Risk, strategy, and financial innovation to conduct certain further studies regarding 
the regulation of short sales. One should expect that there likely will be more regulation of short sales that  
could impact private equity funds. Dodd-Frank act also seeks (SEC) to study regulation about short sales.  
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In future it is expected that strict regulation might be enforced in such activity. (Muller and Chertok,  
2011). 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on Dec., 2013 reported on Volcker rule. It reports, Volcker rule, 
named after former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker. Volcker rule bans banks from using their own 
funds for trading activities. It further states that, Volcker rule stretching to 800 report, at its core, the rule 
imposes a strict ban on so-called "proprietary trading", which is when banks use their own funds to make  
trades. While, banks have argued that the rule is too comprehensive and makes it difficult to distinguish  
between trades made for profit and those done simply to hedge against risk. Banks have still 21 July, 2015 
to comply with the rule. 
Politicians  in  United  States  as-well  as  in  European  Union  claimed,  new  rules  and 
regulations towards hedge fund is the right way, to move forward. 
USA today on Dec., 2013 reported Mr. Obama saying, "As part of this Wall Street reform, we fought to 
include the Volcker Rule- a rule that makes sure big banks can't make risky bets with their customer's  
deposits.  The Volcker Rule will  make it  illegal  for  firms to use government-insured money to make 
speculative bets that threaten the entire financial system, and demand a new era of accountability from 
CEOs who must sign off on their firm's practices. Overall this was the objective of American government, 
for series of rules towards hedge fund.
5.3   Regulations and Hedge fund Trend
Financial times on October 13, 2013 reported that, Targeted hedge fund rules in both the EU and US, as 
well as regulations affecting the markets in which hedge funds trade and the manner in which they do so  
make for an unprecedented set of rules and costs for the once freewheeling hedge fund world to get to  
grips with. Financial times further states, KPMG, the consultancy survey in which it estimated, hedge  
funds  had  spent  $3  billion  meeting  compliance  costs  associated  with  new regulations  since  2008  –  
equating to, roughly, a 10 per cent increase in their annual operating costs.
In future, regulations towards hedge fund might be more strict. Western economy, with 
changing  politics  in  uncertain  landscape  might  come  up  with  a  far  more  strict 
regulation, to earn more public support. Hedge funds need to adapt with it and become 
more transparent in the way of its operation.
There  are  however,  critics  towards  government  policies  as-well,  especially  towards 
hedge fund. 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness (CCMC) President and CEO 
David Hirschmann is concerned about the future of hedge fund after strict rules were passed through 
senate against hedge fund. On his personal statement he reported that, “The Volcker Rule is the most  
complex  rule  stemming  from  the  already  convoluted  Dodd-Frank  law,  and  its  impacts  will  have  a 
significant effect on the broader economy. Since it was first proposed, we have warned that the Volcker  
Rule may harm the ability of businesses to raise the capital needed to grow and operate. The Volcker Rule  
may shut Main Street businesses out of some markets, raise the costs of capital, and place the United 
States at a competitive disadvantage in a global economy. That is not a winning formula for sustained 
economic growth and job creation.
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Considering these aspects, new rules and regulations might bring hardship not only on 
the hedge fund operation but, also on the overall economy. It is not the government 
responsibility to take care of toxic assets. Some of these assets, which are of no real 
value are passed from one financial organization to others, which created pile of toxic 
assets. Few financial organization, in order to be safe from loss, passed toxic assets in 
cheaper price by hiding its true value as a part of normal buying and selling strategy. 
This process made toxic assets to spread in overall financial sectors. Instead of one big 
financial  player  to  pay the price  of  those toxic assets  it  purchased,  whole financial 
organizations got involved in it. This created whole financial system in a mess. 
Government role here should be to encourage whistle-blowers, who can report wrong 
doing  on  time,  rather  than  punishing  whole  financial  system.  Government  need  to 
punish  those  individuals  who  passed  these  toxic  assets  around  whole  financial 
institutions.  Punishing overall  financial  institutions is  not  a  solution.  Although,  it  is 
believed that regulators might push for more regulations towards hedge fund to avoid 
future economic crisis. Such a strategy by any government need to be highly calculated.
6.0   FINAL INTERPRETATION
In this paper, researcher used (2009-2013) time period to investigate real return of hedge 
fund by comparing it with two major form of bias. Both bias revealed upward trend. 
Survivorship bias  was at  average 0.27 percentage annually while,  backfill  bias with 
average 0.78 percentage annually. Both bias, if taken into account to form real return of 
hedge fund, real growth changes to certain degree. But, it shall be inaccurate to present 
new real  hedge fund return after  including these  bias.  There  are  other  bias  as-well, 
which has some impact on hedge fund growth. Considering only prime bias in this case 
might  be  unsound.  This  research  paper  showed  two  prime  bias  as  significantly 
prevailing in hedge fund.
Backfill  bias  result  in  this  paper  is  in  contrary  to  several  previous  researchers 
conclusion. Dropping 12 months returns from (2009-2013) gave us return, lower than 
(2009-2013). Period (2010-2013) return stands at 9.43 percentage while, period (2009-
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2013) at 13.34 percentage. This behaviour of backfill bias can be the result of various 
reasons. Bias research in this paper for funds, operating from (2009-2013) differs from, 
various past researchers bias calculation period. Many funds who are doing good, might 
not report its return for certain periods. This might be because, they do not seek any 
public  attention  to  them.  Moreover,  general  observation was that,  financial  crisis  of 
2009 might have negative impact on hedge funds return.  But, they might have used 
numerous diversified strategies to full-fill their goals. 
Most of the past research on hedge fund bias pose grave question to the overall hedge 
fund  return.  In  actual,  real  growth  of  hedge  fund  is  hard  to  verify  and  present  it. 
Excluding all  biases in hedge fund can not  be done.  Government  regulations might 
make hedge funds more transparent. But, most of the regulations in United States and 
European Union are  keeping constant  check on hedge fund risky strategy.  There  is 
nothing wrong in taking risk. Hedge fund has been operating in such ways and they 
should  be  allowed  for  it.  Instead  of  strict  regulations,  government  could  have 
implemented regulations for whistle blowers, who can be rewarded and protected. They 
might be able to stop future wrong doings.
Bias  figures  reported  in  this  research  paper,  poses  investors  with  another  important 
question.  Why hedge fund managers  are  paid  huge amount,  if  hedge funds are  not 
delivering what it reports? In this research paper, as-well as research papers in the past  
regarding hedge fund bias, has pointed out positive prime bias in hedge fund. It gives 
investors some understanding about bias, but these prime bias figures are not enough to 
reach  for  final  conclusion  towards  real  hedge  fund  return  figure.  With  such  an 
uncertainty, it is up-to the investors, either to include these prime bias to conclude real 
return of hedge fund or dismiss it, and seek for alternative to hedge fund.
There are, few but positive hope for hedge fund in future. With increasing regulation for 
the sake of consumer protection,  hedge fund industry can be more transparent.  This 
would provide investors with new information and more options. However, there is no 
lack of better alternative to hedge fund. The Economist, on-line edition on June 2013 
reports,  ‘investors face  a  quandary.  Cash  offers  a  return  of  virtually  zero  in  many 
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developed countries; government-bond yields may have risen in recent weeks but they 
are still unattractive’. The Economist went further with, ‘smart beta can be a new option 
for the investors. It breaks old tradition where investors instead of buying back stock or 
bond, investors monitor asset class’. Investors need to cautious with bias prevailing in 
hedge  fund,  as-well  as  newer  possibilities  in  hedge  fund  industry,  before  making 
investment decision.
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